What Hidden Agendas Lie Behind the Recent Pakistan-Taliban Confrontation?

Mohammad Farhad Jalal 

Pakistan views the Taliban in Afghanistan as its strategic depth, particularly against Indian influence in Afghanistan and the region. Following the Mujahideen’s rule in Kabul and the civil wars of the 1990s, Pakistan brought the Taliban to power and recognized them as rulers of Afghanistan during their first period in 1996, to dismantle the Mujahideen factions whose usefulness to Pakistan had expired. During their first period, the Taliban were largely under the influence of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus and government, maintaining limited engagement with the outside world at the time. However, with the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States foreign policy toward the presence of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan became operationally active. In line with Pakistan’s security doctrine, the country simultaneously maintained its ties with the Taliban while repositioning itself as a strategic partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism and Al-Qaeda.

While Pakistan’s approach paved the way for the Taliban’s overthrow, the country also provided safe havens for Taliban leaders. Over time, it re-armed the Taliban and positioned them against NATO forces led by the United States. Meanwhile, the machinery producing jihadist ideology in Pakistan became increasingly active, supplying abundant human resources to militant groups, particularly the Taliban. Alongside this, Pakistan, drawing on its own security calculations, recognized that the time for the withdrawal of NATO forces had come, and accordingly facilitated direct negotiations between the United States and the Taliban, while its intelligence agency sought to maintain direct involvement in the Taliban’s negotiating agenda with the United States. Ultimately, however, that did not come to pass. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s approach in engaging with the Taliban was among the factors that contributed to weakening the republican system and subsequently laid the groundwork for the collapse of the Afghan government.

The Taliban regime came to power in its second period based on the Doha Agreement in August 2021 and entered into direct engagement with the Americans. This time, the Taliban delegation negotiated with the American delegation with a degree of independence and paid less heed to Pakistan’s intelligence establishment. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), owing to ideological similarities, has in fact been an integral part of the Taliban’s structure since its founding. This group has become a headache for the Pakistani government following the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, posing a serious challenge to the country’s security. The TTP is considered an inseparable component of the Afghan Taliban and receives their support, something Pakistan does not expect to occur on Afghan soil. Although Pakistan has repeatedly asked the Afghan Taliban not to support the TTP and not to facilitate the presence of its leaders in border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have on multiple occasions denied supporting the TTP and have referred the matter to Pakistan’s internal affairs.

This comes amid a deterioration in Pakistan-Taliban relations that has escalated from verbal tensions to armed clashes at border points between the two countries. In addition to targeting Taliban military installations, Pakistan has repeatedly carried out airstrikes on residential areas in Afghanistan’s border provinces and even in Kabul, resulting in the deaths of dozens of civilians. Pakistan, however, frames these strikes as its legitimate right in the fight against terrorism. In response, the Taliban have also carried out attacks on border areas and Pakistani outposts. Although such clashes in the past were short-lived and relations eventually returned to normal, the recent clashes, which have spanned several days, appear to be different from previous episodes. Pakistan once again has the support and confidence of the United States. In addition, the American president, following his return to power in his second term, has on multiple occasions referenced the recovery of American military equipment left with the Taliban.

It appears that Pakistan, capitalizing on this situation, has been tasked with destroying the American military equipment remaining in Afghanistan through airstrikes, under the pretext of fighting terrorism. Meanwhile, the United States, to preserve its relationship with the Taliban, which currently aligns to a relative degree with American interests, seeks, by shifting its approach and engaging with the Pakistani government, to destroy the leftover American equipment in a manner that lets it have it both ways. In addition, Pakistan is working to extract concessions from the United States, especially given that the country is in a difficult economic situation and recovering from it without American cooperation would be arduous. In light of these reasons, it can be said that there are concealed objectives in the background of the recent war between Pakistan and the Taliban, which are as follows:

First, if this were a genuine war, given the scale of casualties and the level of Pakistani intervention through airstrikes on Afghanistan over the past few days, diplomatic relations should have been severed, and the embassies of both countries closed. However, this has not happened, and the Taliban have only summoned the Pakistani ambassador in Kabul. Under established international norms and conventions, when one country attacks another, and those attacks persist, the severing of diplomatic relations based on the Vienna Convention of 1961 would be a foreseeable course of action following reciprocal measures, which carry a legal dimension. Although the Taliban have carried out retaliatory attacks at border points, these too appear to have been selective.

Second, among the other indicators suggesting this conflict is not genuine is the ambiguous and wavering stance of Taliban officials. The war is being led by second-tier figures from the Taliban’s ministries of defense and interior. Furthermore, no incidents of bombardment targeting Taliban leadership have been reported. This in itself indicates that the war is proceeding according to a pre-determined scenario.

Third, the silence of the Taliban Supreme Leader is also noteworthy. He is someone who had previously declared war against Pakistan to be illegitimate. If this war is real, then why has the Taliban Supreme Leader not made any statement to date, particularly given that Pakistani bombardments across various areas have killed and wounded dozens of innocent civilians? While Pakistani officials have occasionally commented on their country’s security situation and Taliban officials have spoken about its consequences, many of these statements appear to have been made to divert public attention.

It appears that following three successive visits by Asim Munir, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, to Washington in 2025, Pakistan has acted on instructions from the American government, with the destruction of the leftover equipment forming part of its mission. Although the United States does not currently wish to displace the Taliban and views preserving the status quo as more aligned with its interests in the region, Pakistan, playing an instrumental role, is once again exploiting the situation to its own advantage.

In light of Pakistan’s recent policy formation toward the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cultivation of ties with several former officials and jihadist leaders of Afghanistan can be seen as a lever of pressure on the Taliban’s conduct in response to Pakistani demands. Pakistan is, once again, utilizing every available tool to secure its interests, and this time has activated jihadist leaders and certain former officials of the Afghan government who are aligned with Pakistani interests, through various means, against the current system. As an example, the Pakistani government hosted them at a conference titled “The First Regional Dialogue Toward Unity and Trust” from September 29 to 30, 2025, in Islamabad.

In conclusion, the recent war between Pakistan and the Taliban, in light of the indicators and factors outlined above, appears more instrumental and staged than genuine. The Taliban regime faces a lack of international legitimacy on one hand, and on the other, lacks access to advanced military equipment, particularly a regular air force. From a military standpoint as well, sustaining a full-scale and prolonged war front with Pakistan appears to be an asymmetric undertaking for the Taliban. At the same time, Taliban leaders are well aware of the sensitivity of this matter and understand that, given the influence Pakistan has had in shaping the Mujahideen factions, the Taliban, and other movements, a confrontation with Pakistan could carry grave consequences for them.