The Taliban, Russia, and the Future of Relations with America

 Mohammad Farhad Jalal 

The collapse of the republican system and the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces in 2021 gave rise to new regional and international alignments. Among these, the relationship between Russia and the Taliban has emerged as one of the most significant developments attracting the attention of regional and global actors. Russia-Taliban relations began roughly a decade ago, when U.S. and NATO forces were still present in Afghanistan, and have continued to expand since. Russia has hosted several meetings in which the Taliban participated. Furthermore, following the Taliban’s return to power, Russia became the first country to formally recognize the Taliban regime. Although relations between the two sides have yet to reach the level of a formal strategic alliance, growing security cooperation, political engagement, and economic interaction indicate that Moscow and the Taliban are working to define a new framework for collaboration — one that extends beyond domestic calculations to influence Taliban relations with the United States and the balance of power across the region.
Given that the United States holds similar demands of the Taliban regarding counternarcotics and counterterrorism, and views the ruling administration in Kabul as a lever for preventing potential attacks against Western interests and those of its allies, maintaining ties with the Taliban helps Washington monitor the movements of China, Russia, and Iran in the region and exploit the power vacuum to advance its own strategic objectives. In light of these regional developments and the importance of engagement with the United States, a central question arises: on what calculus of power does the Taliban calibrate its foreign policy balance?
The Evolution of Russia-Taliban Relations
Taliban-Russia relations have experienced significant ups and downs over the past three decades. Although Russia was a staunch opponent of the Taliban in the 1990s and supported the Northern Alliance, in recent years it has adopted a pragmatic approach toward the group. Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, new threats emerged that endangered the security of Russia and its neighboring states. This prompted Moscow to view the Taliban not merely as an ideological movement, but as an actor capable of securing Afghanistan’s borders with the Central Asian states.
For their part, the Taliban have sought to expand their ties with regional countries, including Russia, to reduce international isolation and gain legitimacy. This mutual outlook has created the conditions for deeper cooperation and broader engagement between the two sides. The most recent visit by Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, the Taliban’s Minister of Defense, to Moscow and his participation in an international forum attended by representatives of various countries reflect the growing trust and deepening relationship between the two parties. This comes as Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that the first International Security Forum, hosted by the Russian Security Council, would be held from May 26 to 29, 2026, at two different venues, coinciding with the 14th International Meeting of Senior Security Officials in Moscow.
As the Taliban regime has cultivated close ties with Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, the pace of investment opportunities for regional economic projects in Afghanistan has also accelerated. Russia’s declared support for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline and the Trans-Afghan railway continues to elevate the Taliban’s role in economic and non-economic engagements with the region and beyond. China, too, is among the regional actors seeking to avoid falling behind its competitors in the emerging contest for a foothold in the Afghan market.
In line with Russia’s strategic doctrine, the conditions for economic cooperation between the Taliban regime and Russia in Afghanistan have been more favorable than with other regional countries. While the TAPI project in Afghanistan has begun its pipeline-laying phase in cooperation with Turkmenistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan have also upgraded their economic ties with Afghanistan. Despite Uzbekistan’s concerns over the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal, the country has not, within the framework of regional dynamics, moved to obstruct the Taliban’s canal project. It appears that the Taliban regime has been more successful in navigating economic relations with its northern neighbors.
The question then is: why does Russia seek security cooperation with the Taliban?
First, the Central Asian republics, three of which share a border with Afghanistan, fall within Russia’s sphere of security interests. Afghanistan has therefore always been a focal point of Russian security attention, as any instability or insecurity in Afghanistan inevitably affects neighboring Central Asian states, which in turn poses a threat to Russian security. Accordingly, Russia seeks, through security cooperation with the Taliban, to ensure that insecurity does not spread to the borders of the Central Asian states and to bind the Taliban through security arrangements.
Second, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is among the groups Russia considers a threat to its security interests along the borders of the Central Asian states. Countering ISKP is therefore a primary priority in Russia’s security doctrine, and Moscow views containing it through security cooperation with the Taliban as an effective approach.
Third, strengthening Russia’s geopolitical position in the region. With the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces, conditions have emerged for expanding Russian influence in Afghanistan and the surrounding area. Russia seeks to capitalize on this opportunity to consolidate its regional influence.
The Taliban, for their part, also need to maintain relations with regional powers and Russia. Since their return to power, and except for Russia, no country has formally recognized the Taliban regime. The Taliban remain in a state of international isolation and, for the survival of their administration, are compelled to forge ties with regional and global powers to reduce that isolation. The Taliban, by pursuing a balanced approach in their foreign policy, also do not wish to confine their relationships to a handful of countries. Maintaining ties with Russia alongside China, Iran, and the Central Asian states gives the Taliban leverage to ease political and economic pressure from the United States and the West.
The Impact of Taliban-Russia Security Cooperation on Taliban-U.S. Relations
Although the Taliban’s growing closeness to Russia may deepen mutual distrust between the Taliban and the United States, Washington believes that strengthening security ties between Russia and the Taliban could diminish its own influence in Afghan and regional affairs. Nevertheless, this distrust will not necessarily lead to a complete rupture in relations between the Taliban and the United States. The two sides still share common interests in areas such as joint counterterrorism efforts, humanitarian issues, international assistance, and relative stability in Afghanistan. As such, the prospect of continued limited and case-by-case engagement between the Taliban and the United States will remain. Additionally, the Taliban may use their relations with Russia and other regional actors as a pressure tool in negotiations with the United States, exploiting great-power competition to extract political and economic concessions.
On the other hand, the Central Asian states have signaled openness to any form of cooperation with the Taliban to contain threats emanating from Afghanistan and prevent the spread of insecurity into their own territories. China also supports stability in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s containment of extremist groups, and will monitor Russia’s relations with the Taliban through the lens of regional security interests. Iran and Pakistan are likewise following this trajectory closely, as any shift in Afghanistan will have implications for their own security and political interests.
Ultimately, the growing rapprochement between the Taliban and Russia can be characterized as part of a broader process of redefining the balance of power in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal. This cooperation has taken shape within the framework of security calculations and geopolitical interests. Russia seeks to expand its regional influence, while the Taliban attempt to alleviate the pressure of political isolation by diversifying their external relations. This cooperation may also heighten U.S. sensitivity toward Afghanistan; however, in the long run, the fate of Taliban-U.S. relations will depend more than anything else on the Taliban’s capacity to manage security threats, attain international legitimacy, and maintain a balance in their relations with major and regional powers. Afghanistan will remain an arena for the competition and engagement of regional and global powers, and Russia’s relations with the Taliban will be one of the defining factors shaping this equation.